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INTRODUCTION 
According to stereotypes, the compliance officer for a large cor­
poration might seem to be something like the cousin of Toby 
Flenderson, the sad-sack human resources director who was the butt of 
so many jokes in the television sitcom, The Office. Like Flenderson, the 
compliance officer might seem to be a kind of joyless drone, constantly 
offering monotonic reminders to the managers and other employees 
about the rules that they have to follow, and regularly handing out 
lengthy forms that need to be completed for some purpose that seems 
elusive to everyone but the compliance officer. If this stereotype rings 
true, it is probably because the process of assuring that a corporation's 
managers, employees, and agents comply with the law seems like a 
dreary adjunct to the corporation's main purpose. This stereotype begs 
a question: must compliance always be understood as an unfortunate 
chore or can it seem more engaging and important to the employees 
and agents of a corporation? 
The stereotypical conception of compliance is reinforced by 
some of the fundamental assumptions about what the primary objec­
tives of a corporation should be and about how a corporation should 
accomplish those objectives. According to the prevailing theory of cor­
porate structure, a corporation exists for the sole purpose of earning 
profits for its shareholders, and all of its actions are to be directed to­
ward that end. If compliance with the law is not an inherently profit-
making activity, it is to be treated as a constraint on the corporation's 
efficient operation. According to this view, compliance will generally be 
considered a burden that inhibits the corporation's ability to earn prof­
its, and it should be discouraged except to the minimum extent 
necessary. 
This view of compliance does not always serve corporations 
we , owever. The potential problems with the stereotypical approach 
o comp lance are evident in the health care field, as corporations try to 
deal with two complicated, open-ended, and ever-evolving sets of stat­
utes and their attendant regulations. These two statutory schemes 
™ fTn ^e Anti-Kickback statute and the False Claims Act 
h itw °r u tT^eSe statutes can apply to many transactions in the 
SVf because they are broadly framed, and because 
c e ai s o ea t care transaction are often complicated and widely 
(703) 570-5264^1 wouldTk^^n? "illllgation- Roni can be reached at roni@]yourtcp.comor 
deta 1 IIha^'lZa bke to hank the FAMU Law Review Team for their laser focus to 
' 1 ^7 ?, ^ bettCr half' MGS' t0 be better every day. 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2015); 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (2012) 
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varied, it is not intuitively obvious how to make sure these rules are 
being followed in any particular case. If one follows the traditional ap­
proach and tries to promote compliance with these statutes by viewing 
compliance as an expensive burden that should be minimized as much 
as possible, the long-term risk of liability will be severe. 
Assuring compliance with these statutes requires a new way of 
thinking about compliance. The traditional view of compliance as a 
constraint on profit-making must be replaced by a conception of com­
pliance as a goal of the corporation, one that must be internalized and 
valued along with the profit-making motive. To be sure, compliance 
must always take a subsidiary place to profit-making as a corporate 
objective, but it should be viewed as a goal of corporate action, not sim­
ply as a constraint upon it. In other words, this paper will argue that 
corporations should stop treating regulatory compliance as a source of 
external costs that should be minimized, and that they should start 
treating regulatory compliance as a legitimate corporate interest that 
must be served alongside other interests. 
This paper offers some suggestions about how to develop a new 
way of thinking about compliance in the context of health care. It be­
gins in Part I by reviewing some of the essential conceptual approaches 
to corporate compliance, especially a developing concept often known 
as the "New Governance." As Part I shows, it is possible to think of 
legal compliance as conformity to a constraint imposed by an outsider 
or as the identification of lawful behavior as a goal to be pursued in 
every corporate act. Having set forth the conceptual background for 
compliance, Part II discusses the specifics of the Anti-Kickback statute 
and the FCA, as a basis for discussing how those statutes can play 
themselves out in the context of the health care services industry. Part 
III reviews a variety of different transactional circumstances in the 
provision of health care services, showing how the Anti-Kickback stat­
utes and the FCA can be implicated, often subtly, in a wide variety of 
situations and how this implication can often lead to conflicting or con­
fusing circumstances that can create real problems for any individual 
who is trying to act in both a lawful and economically efficient manner. 
Finally, the paper concludes by arguing that many of the insights of 
the New Governance approach to compliance can be profitably applied 
In the provision of health care services as a means of making compli­
ance a goal of corporation action rather than a constraint upon it. 
Because these statutes do not present simple black-letter rules that 
aPPly uniformly, complying with them requires creative engagement 
°n the part of corporate managers, employees, and agents; any effec­
tive compliance program must work to cultivate this engagement and 
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assure that individuals see themselves in a collaborative role with the 
compliance office. 
I. FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 
Corporations and other forms of enterprise organizations face a 
challenge in assuring that their employees conform to legal require­
ments, especially when those requirements are complicated.2 One 
essential method for assuring lawful conduct by employees is to estab­
lish a compliance program.3 Such programs come in a variety of forms 
and are shaped by a variety of different theoretical approaches.'1 Un­
derstanding the essential elements of compliance programs generally 
is necessary for any understanding of how health care corporations can 
most effectively avoid violating federal anti-kickback and anti-fraud 
laws.5 
Corporate compliance programs involve a system of policies and 
controls that organizations implement as a means of preventing viola­
tions of law.6 In addition, the mere existence of such programs can 
stand as a demonstration of corporate good-faith, which may make it 
easier for the corporation to distance itself from unlawful conduct by 
its employees.7 Such programs often have different levels.8 At the 
broadest and most general level, the programs aim to promote the 
overall conduct of business in accordance with prescribed legal, and 
increasingly ethical and cultural, norms.9 Compliance functions under­
taken by corporations and other business entities include the 
promulgation of behavioral codes, the institution of training programs, 
the identification of internal compliance personnel, and the creation of 
procedures and controls to ensure company-wide compliance with reg­
ulatory requirements.10 
2. Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compl 
once with Law, 2002 COLIJM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 81-82 (discussing compliance programs ar 
their principal elements). 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. See id. 
6. See generally id. 
7. See generally Langevoort, supra note 2. 
8 See generally Corporate Compliance Comm., ABA Section of Bus. Law, Corpora 
Compliance Survey, 60 Bus. LAW. 1759 (2005) 
9. Id. 
a R°S^in'General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary Findim 
and New Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465 466-67 (2008). ' 
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Compliance programs are typically administered by a chief 
compliance officer who reports to executive management and is ulti­
mately responsible for defining the elements of the program and for 
assuring that it is carried out.11 Most commonly, compliance programs 
include both policy-making and investigatory functions.12 In their pol­
icy-making components, compliance programs write, revise, and 
update corporation-wide codes of business conduct.13 These codes spe­
cifically define what employees must do to conform to legal 
requirements and what is unlawful.14 Corporate conduct codes also 
serve an educational function, informing employees about the legal 
limits on their conduct.15 With respect to their investigatory functions, 
compliance programs and their administrators monitor and discipline 
employees to prevent or sanction employees who may breach or have 
breached either the corporation's own conduct policy or state or federal 
laws.16 
In the most general terms, the idea of corporate compliance has 
both a positive and a negative aspect.17 In positive terms, a corporation 
should comply with the law because its management, employees, and 
other agents internalize the applicable legal rules, understanding and 
accepting the purposes and objectives of those rules and integrating 
that understanding into the corporate culture.18 In negative terms, cor­
porate compliance means avoiding both civil and criminal liability.19 
From this negative perspective, corporations are not trying to promote 
or achieve the objectives behind the law; they are simply trying to 
avoid liability.20 As this section will show, the greatest emphasis for 
compliance programs has traditionally been on the negative aspects of 
compliance, but there is an increasing movement toward positive ones, 
especially with respect to the idea that the regulators and regulated 
should collaborate on identifying shared goals arising from the applica-
11. See Rostain, supra note 10, at 482. 
12. See generally id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 450 (2008). 
17- See generally Lynn L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Cor­
porations and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of hnron s 
Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2003) (discussing the formation of corporate culture). 
ls- Id. 
19. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and 
Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 Geo. L.J. 1559, 159» 
<1990). 
20. See infra Section II.A. 
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ble regulatory scheme.21 Moreover, one useful way to understand the 
difference between the positive and negative aspects of compliance is to 
think of them as the difference between the internalization of the goals 
behind the law and the avoidance of external constraints.22 
A. Compliance as Conformity With External Constraints 
One way to understand compliance is to see it as conformity 
with a restraint imposed by an external actor.23 According to this con­
ception, a corporation's compliance program is an instrument for 
avoiding sanctions by external authorities who are engaged in an ad­
versarial relationship with the corporation.24 This conception begins 
with the premise that compliance is important because it diminishes 
the risk that the corporation will be punished by regulatory agencies or 
by the courts through civil or criminal litigation.25 
1. "Constraint" as an External Cost 
The idea of legal requirements as an external force is founded in 
economic theory. According to economic theory, compliance with legal 
rules involves an external cost, which is a theoretically unnecessary 
burden on the business enterprise because it does not arise from the 
essential aspects of the enterprise itself.25 When government creates a 
legal rule for private actors, it is serving some public interest but im­
posing the costs of such service on a private actor.27 Because an 
external cost adds inefficiency, economic theory characterizes it as 
something to be minimized or avoided, if possible.28 
Under this conception of the economic effect of regulation, com­
pliance with laws will always be contrary to the core interests of a 
usiness enterprise, and the government agencies enforcing compli­
ance will necessarily be in an adversarial relationship with the 
enterprise.29 In an adversarial relationship that often culminates in 
21. See infra Section II.B. 
22. See infra Sections II.A, II.B. 
961-62 (^09Wde^hinChtKr Governir^ Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. Rkv. 949, 
to the risk of the rrimi"8! ' e °Pment of corPorate compliance programs as a response to the risk of the criminal prosecution of corporations). 
24. Baer, supra note 23, at 961-62. 
25. See id. 
26. See id. 
27. See id. 
28. See id. at 961-62. 
29. See Baer, supra note 23, at 979. 
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litigation, the parties anticipate allegations and factual and legal dis­
putes between them; thus, a compliance program created in light of 
this presupposition can wind up placing as much emphasis on prepar­
ing for litigation as on preventing unlawful conduct by corporate 
employees.30 Of course, avoiding liability for wrongdoing is a far differ­
ent thing than promoting the utmost compliance with law, and it 
involves a much lower standard of conduct.31 Consequently, when a 
compliance program primarily aims to insulate the corporation from 
liability, that corporation will aim for a much lower standard of legal— 
not to mention ethical—behavior by its employees.32 
2. External Costs and Adversarial Relationships 
The presupposition of an adversarial relationship between the 
regulators and the regulated also affects the relationship between the 
corporation and its employees.33 When a compliance program is prima­
rily focused on preparing for adjudicative outcomes, the corporation in 
general, and the compliance program in particular, can assume an ad­
versarial posture of their own with respect to the corporation's 
employees.34 When the corporation conceives of compliance by focusing 
on protecting itself from the unlawful conduct of its employees, the cor­
poration is effectively interposing itself between the outside regulator 
and its employees.35 This is particularly true when the relevant regula­
tions come from criminal law, and the anticipated adjudication is a 
criminal prosecution against either the corporation itself or the em­
ployee or both.36 If a compliance program is based on a contemplation 
of this result, it may provide as many incentives to cover up illegal 
behavior as to avoid it, and therefore it could be just as likely to pro­
mote plausible deniability for the corporation as it is to encourage 
employees to internalize and abide by legal requirements.37 In the end, 
this kind of result could have the perverse effect of actually lowering 
30. See Baer, supra note 23, at 979-80. 
31. Id. at 961-62. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 984. 
34. Baer, supra note 23, at 984; see also Robert J. Ridge & McKenzie A. Baird, The 
Pendulum Swings Back: Revisiting Corporate Criminality and the Rise of Deferred Prosecu­
tion Agreements, 33 U. DAYTON L. REV. 187, 196 (2008). 
35. See Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 
1625-26 (2007). 
36. Id.-, see also Baer, supra note 23, at 984. 
37. Baer, supra note 23, at 986. 
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the normative standards that, as a practical matter, govern employee 
conduct.38 
3. The Problem of an Adversarial Approach in a Complex 
Organizational Environment 
The potential disjunction between the corporation and its em­
ployee's points out a problem with basing a compliance program on 
adversarial presuppositions: Such a program does not accurately ac­
count for organizational dynamics of the corporation.39 Not all 
constituents of a corporation will have precisely the same interests and 
motives with respect to compliance, but, the adversarial approach pre­
supposes that they do.40 To be sure, the conception of the corporation 
as a unitary entity is useful—and sometimes even necessary—in many 
legal contexts.41 But, in the context of promoting compliance with the 
law, it can make it harder to achieve a realistic understanding of how 
to most effectively assure that employees follow the law.42 
A corporation's organizational dynamics determine how its cor­
porate culture is created and, therefore, how it disseminates 
information and communicates norms among its employees. Some cor­
porations may organize horizontally through overlapping and diffuse 
networks; others may divide labor and information within a traditional 
hierarchical structure.43 Regardless of what any corporation's particu­
lar organizational structure might be, the structure controls the flow of 
information through the company, and the varying nature of informa­
tion flows presents varying opportunities for employees and managers 
to respond to legal requirements, either by complying with them or vio­
lating them.41 In addition, any corporation's structure has important 
38. Baer, supra note 23, at 986; see also Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of 
I ubhc Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2076 (2005). 
39. Baer, supra note 23, at 986. 
40. Id. 
41. See id. 
?2, SeeK™neth Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking 
and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 382 (2006). 
U "r16 M326; Yane Svetiev- Antitrust Governance: The New Wave of 
management ^ 5f' 62°*21 (2007) discussing the effect of more innovative 
brid J °" for™ation of corporate culture); see also Stephen M. Bain-
(IMUdZcriKnl ? Ma'\agen\ent mthin a T>™ry of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 669-71 
culture) g C°nVentl0nal structures of internal firm organization that affect corporate 
REV8N°I844-45 (2007M nnf'  T'l Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. 
mation from i cornnmt \ 'i"8 J organizational structure may affect the flow of infor-
flowmanagement and that such an information 
en 0 wh,ch lower-level management and other employees com-
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consequences for determining what the corporate culture will be - or 
even whether there will be multiple distinct corporate cultures across 
different subdivisions of the entity.45 Thus, the factors that determine 
compliance within one subdivision of the corporation may be entirely 
different from those that determine compliance within another subdi­
vision.46 In such a complex corporate culture, the task of defining and 
administering a compliance program can be quite difficult.47 
A regulatory and compliance process constructed around adver­
sarial relationships only makes it more difficult, if not impossible, for 
the law to recognize such complexity.48 Because the adversarial system 
ascribes liability to the corporation itself, as a unitary whole, it cannot 
recognize the reality of conflict or differences among different sub-units 
of the corporation.49 Indeed, because the corporation's own internal 
structure tends to be invisible to outsiders, it is difficult for any exter­
nal regulators or adjudicators to even identify differences among sub-
units within the corporation.50 
To be sure, however, adversarialism does have its uses.51 For 
one thing, an adversarial relationship between the corporation and the 
government agency imposing regulation can help prevent the problem 
of regulatory capture - the circumstance in which the regulators defer 
to the interests of the regulated entity rather than the public interest 
associated with the regulation.52 As one commentator has pointed out: 
Early in the agency's life cycle . . . [the agency's] actors maintain an 
adverse posture, perhaps activated by an original regulatory vision. 
Later on, personal career interests, interest group influence activi­
ties and the cooperative dispositions that accompany personal 
relationships can cause administrators' motivations to shift in a 
ply with the law); see also Lawrence Mitchell, Structural Holes, CEOs, and Information 
Monopolies: The Missing Link in Corporate Governance, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1322-23 
'2005) (discussing how organizational structure can affect information flows and determine 
which managers or employees are in a position to violate the law and how they could violate 
it). 
45. Dallas, supra note 17, at 23 (noting that "[clorporate clime is not static, but is an 
ongoing process. It may vary among sub-units of the corporation, although the corporation 
may have a dominant type"). 
46. Baer, supra note 23, at 987. 
47. Id. 
48. ID. 
49. ID. 
50. See Buell, supra note 35, at 1625. 
51. See William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarhanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus 
Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1032 (2003). 
52. See id. 
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more accommodating direction. The regulatory mission becomes 
compromised as a result.53 
Thus, without a certain level of adversarialism, regulators can lose the 
discipline necessary for effective enforcement and for preserving the 
inherent integrity of the regulatory system.54 In short, adversarialism 
helps preserve a valuable degree of dynamic tension between the regu­
lated corporation and the regulating agency, but if it is taken too far, it 
can lead to a disregard of factors that are important in cultivating a 
culture of compliance. 
B. Compliance as the Realization of an Internalized Goal 
Despite the dictates of economic theory, it is not essential to 
view the regulatory process and compliance as being antithetical to the 
objectives of a business enterprise.55 Businesses need not view enforce­
ment authorities as adversaries, and it is not essential to treat 
compliance costs as externalities that must be minimized.56 It is possi­
ble to view compliance with the law as a positive value, the realization 
of which should be a goal for the corporation." This means that compli­
ance does not necessarily involve an adversarial relationship.58 
Despite their prevalence in the Anglo-American legal tradition, 
adversarial relationships are not the only instruments for advancing 
legal objectives.59 Significant recent scholarship has suggested that 
merican institutions rely too often on adjudication and related legal 
strategies to accomplish social goals." This critique focuses on how un-
tended externalities and transaction costs have undermined the 
eXeai.ar dem0cratlc values that the legal system is supposed to 
serve.61 As one commentator observed: 
53. Bratton, supra note 51. 
54. See id. 
DEREGULATION DKBATE 86-87 FL992)!WAITK' RKSPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING TI 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 86-87. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
turalApproach, 101 CoLUM.Tkfv^SS 462(2001l- ?"lployJfe"t Discrimination: A Sir, 
in Politically Distressing Tim**- rnn \r ' Susan D. Carle, Progressive Lawyeri 
Effective Structural Change 30 HARV TJ X n l"stltut'onal Self-Reform Achieve Mi 
Using Tort Litigation to Enforce ReguiafL ^ ~ 323'p325 (2007)' Ti™*hy D" L*t( 
igation in Light of Lessons from Cm lit Makmg: Evaluating Climate Change L 
I- REV. 1837 1837 (2008) Gun'Indus^ and Clergy-Sexual-Abuse Lawsuits, 86 Ti 
61. Carle, supra note 60, at 325. 
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Even at its best, litigation is expensive and time-consuming It is 
surely a much better use of limited resources on all sides to devote 
efforts to finding creative methods for moving forward, rather than 
to be involved in endless gamesmanship and finger-pointing fo­
cused on what has gone wrong in the past.62 
One alternative approach to promoting regulation is associated 
with the concept of "New Governance."63 This concept involves promot­
ing more shared responsibility and power between regulators and 
regulated entities.64 According to some scholars, such shared responsi­
bility and power would permit different groups to collaborate with each 
other, sometimes in shifting alliances, to negotiate solutions to com­
plex problems as they arise.65 Other advocates of this shared 
responsibility see it as a means of promoting experimentation in both 
rule-making and enforcement, which could reduce the cost of verifica­
tion and compliance.66 Regardless of the theoretical justifications for it, 
the New Governance approach to regulation focuses on three aspects: 
solving practical problems rather than vindicating abstract principles; 
permitting more fluid regulatory structures; and making enforcement 
a matter of persuasion more than punishment67 
One of the defining elements of the New Governance approach 
to regulation is the idea that it is better to solve problems through col­
laboration with the persons and entities who are subject to regulation, 
especially when such collaboration permits experimentation.68 As one 
commentator explains: 
Such an approach is necessary because problems have become too 
complex for government to handle on its own, because disagree­
ments exist about the proper ends of public action, and because 
government increasingly lacks the authority to enforce its will on 
62. Carle, supra note 60, at 325. 
63. Baer, supra note 23, at 1000-15. 
64. See, e.g., AYRES & BUAITHWAITE, supra note 55, at 86-87; Michael C. Dorf & Charles 
• Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Jody 
reeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795, 860 
(2005); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Per­
formance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001); Orly 
L°bel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary 
Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and 
I e Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611 (2001); William H. 
imon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liber­
alism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127 (2004); Jason Solomon, Book Note, Law and Governance 
m the 2lst Century Regulatory State, 86 TEX. L. REV. 819 (2008). 
65. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 64, at 267; Simon, supra note 64, at 127. 
66. AYRES & BRAITIIWAITE, supra note 55, at 3-4. 
67- Dorf & Sabel, supra note 64, at 267; Simon, supra note 64, at 127. 
68- Salamon, supra note 64, at 1623. 
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other crucial actors without giving them a meaningful seat at the 
table.69 
Under a New Governance approach, the regulators and regu­
lated entities are involved in a dialogue to reached shared objectives, 
and the regulated entities are granted significant discretion to devise 
processes necessary to achieve those goals.70 As William Simon has 
contended, by focusing on problem-solving as the core objective of regu­
lation, the New Governance approach emphasizes "common interests, 
rather than the notion connoted by the idea of rights of individual in­
terests competing with group interests."71 This kind of collaboration 
and discretionary action promotes an atmosphere of trust, in which 
both public and private actors can feel freer to fully disclose relevant 
information and assure that the regulatory system is constantly adapt­
ing to meet new realities in the regulated field.72 
The collaborative process at the heart of New Governance re­
gimes means that regulators and regulated entities will work together 
to determine performance goals for the entity, as well as the procedu­
ral mechanisms by which those performance goals will be 
accomplished.7! This means that the regulators are in a better position 
to assess the viability of the assumptions underlying regulatory objec­
tives.74 Collaboration also gives regulators a tangible stake in assuring 
that performance objectives and procedural mechanisms will work in 
the real world occupied by the regulated entity.75 
The collaborative approach to New Governance regulation also 
involves a reduction in the severity of formal sanctions, especially for 
firms that initially fail to reach prescribed standards.76 Lesser and ini­
tial violations are met with efforts at persuasion and consultation by 
e regu ators.77 If the corporation's violations are egregious and repet­
itive, more punitive measures can be employed.78 In addition, some 
proponents of New Governance have also called for the creation of new 
torms of sanctions, including social control sanctions, such as "re-in-
69. Salaraon, supra note 64, at 1623. 
no teM, atTeiT™ 23' 10°2; Bamber«er. note 42, at 377-78; Salomon, su, 
71. Srmon, supra note 64, at 178; Baer, supra note 23, at 1004 
72. Lobel, supra note 64, at 462; Baer, supra note 23, at 1002. 
74' BUT™ mPra n°to M, at 106; Baer, supra note 23, at 1003. 
• Baer- supra note 23, at 1003. 
LdJ7 t BliAI™W";E' m"ra note 65, at 106; Baer, supra note 23, at 1003. 
Lobel, supra note 64, at 395; Baer, supra note 23, at 1004. 
l i J lPP  ffl/nrrt nn tn  OO « i 1  r \ r \ r -
75. 
76. 
77. Baer, supra note 23, at 1005 
78. Id. 
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tegrative shaming."79 The objective of these new forms of sanctions is 
to "indu[cel guilt and responsiveness in the wrongdoer" unlike punitive 
sanctions, which are much more likely to "induce anger and resis­
tance," which can be obstacles to on-going compliance.80 
Given the rhetoric with which it is typically presented, it would 
be easy to see the New Governance approach as a kind of Utopian 
ideal.81 After all, who could be against collaboration, problem-solving, 
and increased trust between government agencies and those that regu­
late them? But such a dramatic departure from established approaches 
to regulation cannot be expected to happen overnight, with the dissem­
ination of some law review articles and some meetings between 
corporate officers and the administrators of regulatory agencies.82 In­
deed, there is a kind of chicken-and-egg problem with shifting to a New 
Governance regime. Collaborative problem-solving and the granting of 
discretion cannot work without a high level of trust between the regu­
lators and the regulated; but trust cannot exist without a history of 
collaboration.83 
C. Combining the Positive and Negative Aspects of Compliance 
All of this shows that, like any new theory, the New Governance 
attempts to re-conceptualize an existing field; and, as with other new 
and largely untested theories, it is not clear whether and to what ex­
tent the New Governance approach will be workable. But there is 
much to recommend the idea of focusing compliance programs on 
showing managers, employees, and agents how to internalize the goals 
of the law and make them their own.84 One reason to promote such 
internalization is that it is consistent with a sophisticated idea of cor­
porate personhood, one that recognizes the corporation as something 
more than a profit-maximizing machine.85 
It is, of course, commonplace to conceptualize the corporation as 
3 purely economic actor that exists only to create profits for its share­
holders and that responds only to the values of the marketplace.80 
According to the finance theory taught in business schools, the idea of 
79. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 55, at 92. 
80. Id. 
81. See id. 
82. Baer, supra note 23, at 1006-07. 
83. Id. 
84. See e.g., Larry D. Thompson, The Responsible Corporation: Its Historical Roots and 
Continuing Promise, 29 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 199 (2015). 
85- Id. at 201-05. 
86. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (40th ed. 2002). 
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profit maximization "does not mean ... a primarily monetary interest, 
a primary concern for economic growth, more income, fewer costs. It 
means truly 'maximization,' a sole concern for profit."87 One of the 
most notable proponents of this viewpoint is the Nobel Laureate Milton 
Friedman, whom insisted that a corporation has "one and only one so­
cial responsibility . . . - to . . . increase its profits . . . ."88 Indeed, 
according to Professor Friedman, it would "undermine the very founda­
tions of our free society" if corporations recognized and acted upon any 
"social responsibility other than making maximum profits for stock­
holders" as possible.89 He posited that any suggestion that a 
corporation should respond to something other than the profit motive 
is "a fundamentally subversive doctrine."90 If the corporation is viewed 
through Professor Friedman's economistic lens, then corporate compli­
ance with the law can only be understood as a constraint on corporate 
action because compliance has no capacity to contribute to increasing 
the bottom line on the corporate balance sheet.91 Under this view, com­
pliance merely involves additional costs that diminish profits, and 
corporations should comply with the law only to the extent necessary 
to avoid costly legal sanctions 92 
However, there are good reasons to reject this purely economic 
viewpoint.98 Human beings have created Corporations to serve human 
needs.94 As one commentator put it, "'[bjusiness' is not a set of value-
free machines. 'Business' is a set of living human organizations al­
lowing us as individuals to live in a way we can stand to live - to have 
lives as individuals we can justify to ourselves and each other."95 
Human beings do more than merely calculate profits; they act in ser­
vice of substantive values other than profit-making.90 Human beings 
87. Thompson, supra note 84, at 202 (quoting Joseph Vining, The Effect of Economic 
Integration with China on the Future of American Corporate Law 1, (Univ. of Mich. Law 
Sch. Scholarship Repository: Law & Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 11, 2010), https:// 
repository .law. u mich .ed u/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1122&context=law econ_cu rrent). 
(emphasis in original). 
88. FRIEDMAN, supra note 86, at 133. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Thompson, supra note 84, at 202. 
92. See id. at 202-03. 
93. See id at 201-05 (arguing against the purely economic conception of the corpora­
tion promoted by Prof. Friedman). 
94. Id. at 202, 202-03. 
T nf> * Joseph Viiiuig Competition, Corporate Responsibility and the China Question, 45 
88 ,2°°3>1 h"P«oty.1aw.umich.edu/cgiWeWconte„t,gi?ar 
96. See id. at 88. 
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do not refrain from taking actions that could harm others simply be­
cause such actions would be costly; they refrain from actions with 
harmful consequences because "[w]e actually don't want someone else 
to be hurt, and if we really don't care, and really are indifferent to the 
consequences of our actions, we are viewed as a bit of a psychiatric case 
and a threat—certainly not someone who can be dealt with in ordinary 
affairs."97 Given this unavoidable fact about human beings and the in­
stitutions they create, it seems anomalous to conceive of the 
corporation as being solely directed to profit-maximization.98 
The case of Enron provides an object lesson in the dangers of an 
exclusive concern with profit-maximization.99 Enron had a state-of-
the-art corporate code of conduct, reflecting a single-minded devotion 
to profit maximization, that led to "the ascendance of unenlightened 
self-interest—winning for yourself; I win, you lose. The Enron ... ra­
tionalization was, 'We didn't do anything wrong, because we didn't 
break the law.'"100 Eventually, of course, Enron did break the law in 
manifold ways, and this result was the consequence of a corporate cul­
ture that was devoted to profits at the exclusion of all other values.101 
One reason that disaster resulted from Enron's single-minded 
devotion to profit is that Enron overlooked the human dimension of the 
corporation. Larry Thompson, former officer with Monsanto and 
Providian Financial Corporation, and a former United States Deputy 
Attorney General, explained the problem with the view of the corpora­
tion as an entity entirely devoted to profit: 
The shortcoming of this view is that the corporation is not solely an 
economic phenomenon - it is a legal phenomenon as well. A busi­
ness corporation does not rise spontaneously from the intersection 
of contracts among private parties in the marketplace. A corpora­
tion is a legal fiction - an artificial person "existing only in 
intendment and consideration of law," and we create these artificial 
persons in our own image. We are social and moral actors with re­
sponsibilities to our community - why should we assume that our 
corporations are not? They have whatever characteristics we endow 
them with and whatever responsibilities we choose to impose on 
them. A corporation has perpetual life; it governs itself through by­
laws of its own choosing, it can buy and sell property and can sue 
and be sued in its own name - and, in law, its liability is limited to 
the assets that it holds in its own name. A corporation possesses 
97. Vining, supra note 95, at 83. 
98. See id. at 88; see also Thompson, supra note 84, at 202-03. 
99. Vining, supra note 95, at 85. 
100. Lenny T. Mendonca & Matt Miller, Interview with Daniel Yankelovich, Public 
Opinion Analyst & Social Scientist, in La Jolla, Col., 2 MCKINSEY Q. 64, 2007, 69. 
101. Thompson, supra note 84, at 202-03. 
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these attributes only because the state has willed that it be so. It is 
therefore more than a little strange to suppose that a body corpo­
rate owes nothing to the body politic that created it as an act of 
legislative grace.102 
As Thompson points out, the corporation should consider non-
economic objectives for another reason; because it has been created by 
law and must respond to the underlying principles that animate the 
law, as well as the explicit legal rules that prescribe certain aspects of 
corporate conduct.103 In other words, the corporation cannot operate 
entirely according to economic principles because it is not the product 
of solely economic forces.104 According to economic theory, considera­
tions relevant to social interests are considered to be "externalities," 
which should not be factored into the corporation's assessment of costs 
and benefits.105 However, the law, not economic theory creates the cor­
poration, and it is the law, not economic theory, that decides what is 
external and what is internal to the corporation.106 
Scholars are not the only ones who reject absolute allegiance to 
Friedman's idea that the corporation can properly be devotpd to profit-
making alone.107 In its Principles of Corporate Governance, the Ameri­
can Law Institute ("ALI") has provided that, in the conduct of its 
business, a corporation has no legal obligation to pursue profit alone 
and "[m|ay devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, 
humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes."108 Indeed, 
the ALI recognizes that such pursuit of non-economic objectives is ap­
propriate "[e]ven if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not 
thereby enhanced."109 Similarly, the Business Roundtable eschews a 
purely economic conception of the corporation and recognizes that cor­
porations have a duty to serve social needs, along with the interests of 
their shareholders in profit-making.110 
Given that many corporations operate internationally, Ameri­
can authorities are not the only relevant ones in determining 
102. Thompson, supra note 84, at 202-03 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA­
RIES *464). 
103. Id. at 203-05. 
104. Id. at 203-05; see also Vining, supra note 95, at 84. 
105. Vining, supra note 95, at 84. 
106. Thompson, supra note 84, at 203-05. 
107. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 
§ 2.01(B) (AM. LAW INST. 1994). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Statement of the Business Roundtable, Corporate Governance and American Com­
petitiveness, 46 Bus. LAW. 241, 244 (1990). 
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fundamental principles of corporate governance, especially the objec­
tives that the corporation should serve. For example, in Japan, a court 
held that the chemical company was liable for the birth defects caused 
by the company's discharge into a bay of waste water which contained 
mercury.111 The company's discharge did not violate any environmen­
tal law; it was in compliance with every statutory and regulatory 
standard.112 Indeed, the company's methods for treating its waste 
water were state of the art and were superior to the methods pursued 
by similarly situated companies.113 The company was liable because it 
had acted in a manner that was contrary to a social interest.114 China 
mandates similar corporate attention to social interests.115 To be sure, 
China's concern with socially conscious corporate behavior could be 
seen as a product of its Communist heritage; its former corporation law 
made business firms responsible for "strengthening socialist spiritual 
civilization."116 However, even after China embraced market capital­
ism, it still expressly requires that a corporation "respect" and act in 
furtherance of "social responsibility."117 Consequently, international 
corporations have an even greater reason to establish governance prin­
ciples that account for something more than profit.118 
A corporation cannot effectively internalize social goals if it 
views compliance strictly as a matter of acting within a constraint im­
posed by law.119 The kinds of objectives that are not comprehended by 
economic theory are more easily achieved when viewed as internal to 
the corporation and not simply as externalities that restrict profitabil­
ity.120 Because a goal is defined from within the corporation (unlike a 
constraint, which is defined by something outside the corporation), it 
can be more effective to view compliance as a goal rather than a 
constraint.121 
Moreover, viewing adherence to the law as the achievement of a 
goal rather than as accession to a constraint can make for more effec-
111. See Vining, supra note 95, at 85-86. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. See id. 
H5. Vining, supra note 95, at 6 (comparing the 1993 and 1999 Companies Law of the 
People's Republic of China). 
U6. Id. 
H7. Id. 
H8. Id. 
119- See id. at 84. 
120- Vining, supra note 95, at 84. 
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tive compliance.122 This is particularly true when the regulatory 
scheme is open-ended and applies to discretionary decision-making by 
corporate actors.123 When a regulation does not create a black-letter 
rule but, instead, demands the thoughtful application of abstract prin­
ciples, compliance training will be much more effective when it 
facilitates the internalization of those principles by corporate actors.124 
The following section will show how the federal regulatory scheme 
prohibiting false claims and kickbacks in the provision health care ser­
vices creates just the abstract and flexible system that resonates with 
the insights behind New Governance ideas of compliance. 
II. THE FEDERAL REGIME FOR PREVENTING FRAUD AND KICKBACKS 
IN HEALTH CARE SERVICES 
The provision of health care services entails a risk that deci­
sions about treatment will be made by what is profitable rather than 
what is medically necessary.125 This is especially true when physicians 
are considering whether to refer a patient to another health care pro­
vider.12<> In this situation, it is important that the medical 
professionals place the patient's interest ahead of any considerations 
about their mutual business advantage.127 
To reduce the possibilities of such self-interested decision-mak-
ing, the federal government has imposed a broadly framed statutory 
prohibition against the payment of kickbacks in connection with the 
provision of any medical service associated with a federal health care 
program.128 According to the Department of Justice's Office of Inspec­
tor General ( OIG"), the purpose of this prohibition "is to protect 
patients and the federal health care programs from fraud and abuse by 
curtailing the corrupting influence of money on health care deci­
sions. 129 Given the breadth of this prohibition, Congress authorized 
the OIG to promulgate regulations defining certain "safe harbors"— 
categories of conduct that will not implicate the Anti-Kickback stat-
??• Y1"'"?'' SUpm n°te 95, at 84; see also Thompson, supra note 84, at 201-05. 
US. See Vining, supra note 95, at 84; see also Thompson, supra note 84, at 201-05. 
124. Vining, supra note 95, at 84. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012). 
129. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 55, at 86-87. 
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ute's prohibitions. |;,° These regulatory safe harbors are essential in 
understanding how the Anti-Kickback statute applies to medical 
practice.131 
Federal law provides additional protection against the abuses of 
medical decision-making through the False Claims Act ("FCA"), which 
prohibits the making of false statements in connection with any claim 
for payment from the federal government—for example, through a 
claim for reimbursement through a federal health insurance pro­
gram.132 Because much of the conduct that could violate the Anti-
Kickback statute also involves false statements about what is medi­
cally necessary, there is substantial overlap between Anti-Kickback 
statute and the FCA with respect to health care providers.133 Conse­
quently, compliance efforts must look to both statutes when 
establishing the boundaries of acceptable conduct. 
A. Anti-Kickback Statute 
One of the key aspects of this federal regulatory regime is the 
prohibition against kickbacks between health care providers. The fed­
eral Anti-Kickback statute imposes criminal penalties on any person 
that "knowingly and willfully solicits, receives, offers, or pays any re­
muneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or 
indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind," to any person: 
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the fur­
nishing or arranging for the furnishing of an item or service for 
which payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal 
health care program, or 
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or 
recommending the purchasing, leasing, or ordering of any good, fa­
cility, service, or item for which payment may be made in whole or 
in part under a Federal health care program.134 
The prohibition on kickbacks is quite broad.135 It applies to es­
sentially every proposed financial interaction, whether or not actually 
implemented, among health care providers and pharmaceutical compa­
nies.1 •i<> In the first years after its enactment, the statute was often 
130. AYRES & BUAITHWAITE, supra note 55, at 86-87. 
!31. See 42 C.F.R. Part 1001 (2017). 
132. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (2009). 
133. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2015), with 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (2012). 
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(l). 
135. See id. 
!36. See Publication of OIG Special Fraud Alerts, 59 Fed. Reg. 65372 (Dec. 19, 1994). 
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interpreted to apply primarily to relationships between institutional 
providers or suppliers and practitioners in a position to generate refer­
rals for the providers or suppliers.137 However, in 1994, the OIG issued 
a fraud alert that made it clear that the statute applied to pharmaceu­
tical marketing activities, including: 
Any prize, gift or cash payment, coupon or bonus (e.g., airline dis­
counts and related travel premiums), offered to physicians and/or 
suppliers (including pharmacies, mail order prescription drug com­
panies and managed care organizations) in exchange for, or based 
on, prescribing or providing specific prescription products. These 
items are particularly suspect if based on value or volume of busi­
ness generated for the drug company. 
Materials which offer cash or other benefits to pharmacists (or 
others in a position to recommend prescription drug products) in 
exchange for performing marketing tasks in the course of pharmacy 
practice related to Medicare or Medicaid. The marketing tasks may 
include sales-oriented educational or counseling contacts, or physi­
cian and/or patient outreach, etc. 
Grants to physicians and clinicians for studies of prescription prod­
ucts when the studies are of questionable scientific value and 
require little or no actual scientific pursuit. The grants may none­
theless offer substantial benefits based on, or related to, use of the 
product. 
Any payment, including cash or other benefit, given to a patient, 
provider or supplier for changing a prescription, or recommending 
or requesting such a change, from one product to another, unless 
the payment is made fully consistent with a safe harbor 
regulation.138 
There is some uncertainty about the mens rea requirement for 
the Anti-Kickback Statute; the statutory text does not define the terms 
nowing and willfully," and the Federal Courts of Appeals are split on 
the definition.139 Some courts have held that the violator must have 
had the specific intent to violate the anti-kickback statute itself.140 
1-57. Publication of OIG Special Fraud Alerts, 59 Fed. Reg 65372 
138. Id. at 65376. 
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Others have set a slightly lower bar for finding mens rea, holding that 
a defendant can be liable under the statute as long as the defendant 
knows its conduct is wrongful, even if it does not know the specific law 
that makes it wrongful.141 Despite this division of opinion of just how 
specific an accused's intent must be, there is no doubt that the statute 
requires a specific intent to engage in wrongdoing as a basis for 
liability.142 
The statute does carve out certain areas of activity that are ex­
empt from the broad statutory prohibition.143 These "safe harbors" are 
set forth in both the statutory text itself, and in regulations established 
by the OIG.144 The safe harbors describe activities that the govern­
ment will not prosecute because the government has determined that 
these activities are unlikely to be abusive.145 The safe harbors are 
more likely to apply to price concessions provided in connection with 
the purchase of drugs or the purchase of expert consulting services, 
than to promotional or other activities that provide "one-sided" value to 
customers and consumers.146 
In addition to the formally defined exceptions and safe harbors, 
there are other ways that particular instances of conduct can escape 
the anti-kickback statute's broad prohibition.147 An arrangement 
among health care providers and/or pharmaceutical companies that 
would, on its face, violate the statute may be deemed lawful by the OIG 
if it does not involve improper intent or does not adversely affect the 
quality of patient care.148 The OIG has described certain "aggravating 
considerations" that identify those arrangements that may pose the 
greatest risk of prosecution.149 Those considerations include: 
Does the arrangement or practice have a potential to interfere with, 
or skew, clinical decision-making? Does it have a potential to under­
mine the clinical integrity of a formulary process? If the 
arrangement or practice involves providing information to decision­
makers, prescribers, or patients, is the information complete, accu­
rate, and not misleading? 
141. See, e.g., Starks, 157 F.3d at 838; Jain, 93 F.3d at 440-41. 
142. See, e.g., Starks, 157 F.3d at 838; Jain, 93 F.3d at 440-41. 
143. See Fact Sheet, supra note 125. 
144. Id. 
145. Fact Sheet, supra note 125. 
146. Id. 
147. See OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 
Reg. 23731, 23736 (May 5, 2003). 
148. Id. 
149. See id. 
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Does the arrangement or practice have a potential to increase costs 
to the federal health care programs, beneficiaries, or enrollees? 
Does the arrangement or practice have the potential to be a dis­
guised discount to circumvent the Medicaid Rebate Program Best 
Price calculation? 
Does the arrangement or practice have a potential to increase the 
risk of overutilization or inappropriate utilization? 
Does the arrangement or practice raise patient safety or quality of 
care concerns?150 
A recent Seventh Circuit case illustrates the challenges in as­
suring compliance with the requirements of the anti-kickback 
statute.151 Because the statute raises delicate factual questions about 
the intent of participants in a transaction and the effect of that trans­
action on their medical decisions, health care providers must take care 
not only in framing the details of any particular transaction itself, they 
must also look to circumstances surrounding that transaction.152 Com­
pliance with the Anti-Kickback statute can be assured only by being 
sensitive to their actions and the attendant contexts for those 
actions.153 
In United States v. Patel, the defendant was an internist who 
treated many elderly patients who needed home care services and paid 
for those services with Medicare benefits.15'1 When Dr. Patel deter­
mined that one of his patients needed home care services, his staff 
provided the patient with brochures from numerous companies that 
provided such services and permitted the patient to make an indepen­
dent choice among them.155 One provider, Grand Home Health Care, 
ottered to pay Dr. Patel for referrals.156 According to Dr. Patel's trial 
estimony, he never affirmatively accepted this offer and continued to 
o ow his existing method of informing his patients about many home 
ea care providers and allowing them to make independent 
oiccs. s it happened, somewhere between two and four patients 
selected Grand each month.™ When a patient selected Grand, Grand 
Create a treatment plan for the patient and fill out a Medicare 
Reg. 23731, 23734^ May^ ^ OO.^"1 Gl"danCe for Phar™aceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. 
I52; V' Pate1' 778 F-3d 607 (2015)" 
153. See id. 
154. Id. at 609. 
155. Id. at 610. 
156. Id. at 609. 
157. Patel, 778 F.3d at 609 
158. Id. at 610. 
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certification form 485 for Dr. Patel's signature, which is required for 
Medicare reimbursement.159 Whenever Dr. Patel signed the certifica­
tion form, Grand would give him $400, and it paid a further $300 for 
his signature on a recertification form, which was required after the 
first sixty days of treatment.160 The payments were made in cash, with 
no written contract or other formal payment record.161 There was no 
dispute that the patients needed the services; nor did the government 
allege that Dr. Patel directed their decision-making about which pro­
vider to choose.162 And only a small minority of his patients used 
Grand.163 
When the government began investigating Grand's business 
practices, Grand agreed to cooperate, and evidence was collected about 
the payments to Dr. Patel, among others.164 Dr. Patel was charged 
with criminal violations of the Anti-Kickback statute, which entailed 
both substantial fines and imprisonment.165 As a defense, Dr. Patel ar­
gued that he had not actually referred any of his patients to Grand 
because they had made their own independent decisions about their 
home health care providers.166 He contended that "refer" means that 
the physician personally recommends that a patient seek care from a 
particular provider, and conversely that there is no "referral" when a 
patient independently chooses a provider.167 
The Seventh Circuit rejected this interpretation of the stat­
ute.168 It concluded that a physician provides a referral anytime that it 
acts as a gatekeeper for the patient's receipt of services.169 In reaching 
this conclusion, the court invoked the statute's principal purpose, 
which is to prevent decision-making that leads to increased cost of care 
and contravention of patient free choice.170 
Dr. Patel insisted that this kind of definition of "referral" would 
criminalize a wide range of innocent activities.171 For example, if a hos­
pital paid a physician to give a speech, Dr. Patel argued that this broad 
159. Patel, 778 F.3d at 610. 
160. Patel, 778 F.3d at 611. 
161. Id. at 611. 
162. See id. at 610. 
163. Id. 
164. Patel, 778 F.3d at 611. 
165. Id. 
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171. Id. at 616. 
270 FLORIDA A&M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 12:2:247 
definition could mean that such a physician could be liable if some of 
his patients are later treated by the hospital that paid for his 
speech.172 The Court disagreed, noting two important points.173 First 
a payment must be "in return" for a referral to trigger the application 
of the statute; payments made solely as compensation for legitimate 
services (such as giving a speech) are not illegal.174 Second, to be a 
"referral," the physician must do something that either directs a pa­
tient to a particular provider or allows the patient to receive care from 
that provider.175 "And even if the doctor in Patel's hypothetical had 
steered his patients to the hospital, the doctor could not be prosecuted 
because he was not paid 'in return for' referrals."176 
The Patel case shows that both physicians and other health care 
providers must be sensitive to all aspects of their business relationship 
in order to avoid a risk of liability under the Anti-Kickback statute.177 
The government views patient referrals in a broad context, and every­
one with any connection to a patient referral must be aware of all 
aspects of that context to assure that no-one takes any actions that 
could be construed as violations.173 This means that any person con­
nected in any way to a health care referral must have a comprehensive 
understanding of the general principles of the statute and must be al­
ways prepared to apply that understanding.179 
B. False Claim and Fraud Laws 
tint* law also Pr°hibits health care providers from submit 
navment connection with claims for governmen 
Eon m 7 7 are or Medicaid reimbursement.'»<> This pre 
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("FCA").182 A person may be subject to penalties under the FCA for 
knowingly submitting a false claim for payment to the federal govern­
ment (or for causing another person to submit such a false claim).183 
Like the Anti-Kickback statute, the FCA requires a high level of 
mens rea for liability.184 For the purposes of the statute, "knowing" or 
"knowingly" means that a person: (1) "has actual knowledge of the in­
formation on which the claim for payment is made"; and (2) "acts in 
deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information"; or, "acts 
in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information."185 Un­
like the Anti-Kickback statute, however, the FCA does not require a 
specific intent to defraud or act wrongfully.186 
FCA claims may be brought by the government or by private 
parties, who act as whistleblowers in a qui tarn action.187 In general, a 
qui tam action is one in which the whistleblower, known in technical 
terms as a "relator," makes a claim on behalf of the government.188 The 
enforcement of the FCA through qui tam actions has increased in fre­
quency in recent years.189 
The remedies available to FCA plaintiffs, including relators, 
can be extensive. For one thing, the FCA provides for mandatory treble 
damages.19" After the judge or jury determines actual damages at trial, 
the court must apply mandatory treble damages.191 In addition, the 
FCA provides for mandatory civil penalties of $5,500 to $10,000 for 
each and every individual claim that is identified at trial.192 In qui tam 
actions, the relator may be awarded as much as thirty percent of the 
recovery on claims where the government does not intervene and up to 
182. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (West 2009); 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730 (West, 2010) 31 U.S.C.A 
3731(West, 2009). 
183. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a). 
184. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b). 
185. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(1)(A). 
186. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(1)(B) (providing the knowledge requirement in the FCA "re-
quire(s) no proof of specific intent to defraud"). 
31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(b)( 1) ("A person may bring a civil action for a violation of section 
29 for the person and for the United States Government. The action shall be brought in 
(1 name of the Government. The action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attor-
n?Y General give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting."); see 
also 31 U S.C.A. § 3730(c). 
188- 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(c). 
189. See generally Amandeep S. Sidhu, The Growing Threat of Qui Tam Litigation 
p"nst ^alth Care Providers, 12 A.B.A SEC. LITIG. 1 (2014), http://www.mwe.com/files/ 
7kq !Cation/9594f763-6360-4b78-af86-04b9dc36c045/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ 
inn 23?"b52C"4104-8231-4eb3db00c5d3/Sldhu Pdf-
J99- 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(G). 
191- Id. 
192. Id. 
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twenty-five percent of the recovery on claims where intervention doe 
occur.193 Finally, the losing defendant may have to pay the relator' 
attorneys' fees and other litigation costs.194 
Amendments to the FCA were effected as a part of the enact 
ment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act195 ("ACA") ii 
2010. These amendments established four significant changes to th 
FCA that favored relators and increased the extent of potential liabil 
ity for health care providers.196 
First, the amendments limited the availability of an often-usei 
defense in qui tarn cases under the FCA.197 Before the ACA, court 
were required to dismiss an action when the factual basis for the rela 
tor's claims had been publicly disclosed.198 But, the ACA amendment 
limited the circumstances under which public disclosure would lead t 
dismissal, and it provided that, even when public disclosure occurrec 
the government could preserve jurisdiction over the case by objectin 
to the motion to dismiss.199 Second, the ACA revised the requiremen 
to provide relators with a lower threshold of knowledge necessary t 
overcome the limitation on actions affected by public disclosure.20 
While the prior statutory language required relators to have "direc 
and independent knowledge of the information on which the allega 
tions are based," the amendments modified the requirement so tha 
they need only have "knowledge that is independent of and material! 
adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions."201 Third, a 
a supplement to earlier amendments that had been part of the 200 
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, the ACA added a sixty-day re 
tention rule for overpayments that could give rise to FCA liability.20 
Aftei the ACA amendments, providers were required to report and re 
turn any overpayments within sixty days of discovery or be subjecte1 
to potential FCA liability.203 Fourth, the ACA resolved a circuit spli 
193. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d). 
194. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d)(4). 
10^20^tdifi^utc^16 Care ACt' PUb' L' N°- m"148' 124 Stat' 
196. Id. 
197. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (West 2005). 
iys. id. 
199. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(A). 
200. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(B) 
201. Id. 
312U2S.CS§§  « USc"Tim AC' °f 2°°9' Pub' L' U1"21- 123 Stat 
Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148; effective Mar. 23, M10) ^  Patien' Pr0teCti°n & ***" 
203. Id. 
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regarding whether claims submitted as a result nf ™ i .• 
anti-kickback statute constitute false claims fnr vlolations of the 
ity.204 With the ACA amendment, p™ 
statutory liability under the anti-kickback statute — aut°matic 
Because the FCA can have snmriein^i,, ^ -
is essential that all employees and agents of hea be 
S^ pTe by the 
United States ex rel. Escobar.™ There a _ w 7™ C°' 
family was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and received^ ores 3 t"" 
tr Medicaid p,M foc he, O 
of several months she suffered repeated seizures from the medication 
eventually dying from complications due to the seizures.- y^her 
parents became concerned that the treatment was not effective they 
complained to state regulators, who discovered that the treatment 
providers were both unqualified and unsupervised.2- When the Com­
pany who had referred the treatment providers was charged under the 
False Claims Act, the question arose whether that company had made 
telt oVk n Spe"flcally'there was a question about the ex-
tent of knowledge about the treatment that was required to trigger 
knnVl a ill defendant company argued that it did not have direct 
therof! g!Jwu un?uaIlfied persons were providing treatment and 
re that the claim for Medicaid reimbursement was false.212 
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that failing to disclose 
non-comphance with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual require-
i- a r ,render 3 Claim false or fraudulent (thereby validating the 
nn 3 G cert^ca^on" theory of liability); however, the Court 
s ne heless imposed a "demanding" standard on plaintiffs to demon-
^ e that the omission was both relevant and important.213 Because 
& nwersal Health Services had submitted claims to Medicaid using 
C1 ic illing codes that misrepresented the qualifications of their 
need not Iv' ^ tJ.S.C. § 1.320a-7b (h) ("With respect to violations of this section, a person 
section ") HVP K'UH' of this section or specific intent to commit a violation of this 
206 n U S C § 1320a-7W«»-
on?* ^n,versal Health Serv's v. U. S. ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016). 
f7- Id. at 1997. 
208. Id. 
209. Id_ 
210. id. 
211 
219 Universal Health Serv's, 136 S. Ct. at 1997. 
Id. at 1998-99. 
' Id• at 1999-2002. 
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workforce, and because the underlying regulatory violations were sub­
stantial, the Court suggested that the plaintiff-relator had met its legal 
burden.214 In particular, the Court pointed to the statute's reference to 
reckless disregard of the truth as a basis for liability, thereby imposing 
a substantial burden on any person or company who submits claims for 
payment from government health insurance programs.215 
This holding means that health care providers cannot avoid 
FCA liability by disregarding the factual circumstances underlying 
treatment.216 They will be required to take an active role in assuring 
the propriety of any services paid for by the government.217 Thus, their 
employees and agents will have to be vigilant about taking an active 
role in understanding all aspects of the treatment process.218 
III. THE APPLICATION OF THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE AND THE FCA 
TO SPECIFIC TYPES OF TRANSACTIONS IN THE PROVISION 
OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES 
Given the breadth of the prohibitions imposed by the Anti-Kick­
back statute and the FCA, there are a wide variety of situations that 
can implicate either or both of these statutes in the provision of health 
care services. In order to understand the principles that should inform 
the development of an effective compliance program, it is necessary to 
understand some of the most prominently discussed situations and 
how they can be handled without violating either the Anti-Kickback 
statute or the FCA. The following section describes some of those 
situations. 
The rules prohibiting kickbacks create a special challenge for 
the sales of any drug or medical device because they create a risk that 
any discount offered on a sale could be characterized as a remunera­
tion paid in return for the purchase of the product.219 In addition, 
because of the intersection between the FCA and the Anti-Kickback 
214. Universal Health Serv's, 136 S. Ct. at 1999-2002 
215. Id. at 2001. 
216. Id. at 2002. 
217. See id. at 2001-02. 
218. See id. 
A. Drug and Device Sales 
, . o J Ouvu 1 lu^iuty, 5CI 
may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health 
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statute, improperly offering or providing a discount that is character­
ized as a kickback could lead to FCA liability as well.220 Thus, the need 
for effective compliance precautions is particularly important when­
ever any seller of health care products or services contemplates 
offering some kind of discount. 
Because discounts can be a perfectly legitimate instrument of 
fair competition in the marketplace, the regulatory scheme surround­
ing the Anti-Kickback statute creates a safe harbor exception for 
discounts.221 This safe harbor protects discounts on items and services 
reimbursed under a federal health care program.222 For the purposes 
of the statutory scheme, "discount" is defined as a reduction in the 
amount a buyer is charged for an item or service based on an arms-
length transaction.223 "Discount" includes rebates and other discounts 
not given at the time of sale.224 The definition excludes all of the follow­
ing: (1) cash payments or equivalents; (2) supplying one good or service 
without charge or at a reduced charge to induce the purchase of a dif­
ferent good or service unless both are reimbursed by federal health 
care programs pursuant to the same methodology (i.e., the same global 
payment); (3) a reduction in price applicable to one payer but not to 
federal health care programs; (4) a routine reduction or waiver of any 
coinsurance or deductible amount: (5) warranties; (6) services provided 
in accordance with a personal or management services contract; or (7) 
other remuneration not explicitly defined as a discount.225 
In its official guidance regarding how to comply with the stat­
utes and regulations prohibiting kickbacks, the OIG emphasized that: 
any remuneration from a manufacturer provided to a purchaser 
that is expressly or impliedly related to a sale potentially implicates 
the anti-kickback statute and should be carefully reviewed .... 
Examples of remuneration in connection with a sale include, but 
are not limited to, "prebates" and "upfront payments," other free or 
reduced-price goods or services, and payments to cover the costs of 
"converting" from a competitor's product.226 
Given that the line between permissible discounts and impermissible 
kickbacks can be so difficult to draw, it is essential to identify particu-
220. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(l). 
221. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(h) (2017). 
222. See § 1001.952(h). 
223- § 1001.952(h)(5). 
224- § 1001.952(h)(4). 
225- § 1001.952(hM5). F , 
n Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 
£• 23731, 23735-36 (May 5, 2003). 
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iar factors that will be important in the distinction that the regulatory 
authorities will make.2'27 
According to guidance from the OIG, the crucial factor in distin­
guishing between legitimate and illegitimate discounts is whether the 
price reduction effected by the discount was a part of the sales transac­
tion.228 In its guidance, the OIG has emphasized that the discount 
must be in the form of a reduction in price given at the time of sale or 
set at the time of sale.229 When a benefit of some kind is defined and 
provided after the sales transaction, it is impermissible to characterize 
such a benefit as a "discount" on an earlier transaction.230 
Apart from the time at which the discount is defined and prom­
ised, there are other factors that can help identify discounts that 
qualify for the safe harbor.231 Many of these factors are specific to cer­
tain kinds of transactions. For example, discounts must be disclosed on 
invoices or similar documentation.232 In addition, the buyer must be 
put on notice of its obligation to report the discount; and nothing must 
be done to impede that buyer from fulfilling its obligations.233 Because 
full disclosure of pricing arrangements is essential for fostering full 
and fair competition, pharmaceutical manufacturers must also track 
and report discounts accurately under various government pricing pro­
grams, many of which require that the price reported include all 
applicable discounts.234 
227. See OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 
Fed. Reg. at 23735-36. 
228. OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fi 
Reg. at 23735. 
229. Id. 
230. See id. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. 
233. OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fi 
Reg. at 23735. 
R 2^4' J*ee' e'8'' 42 U.S.C. §1396r-8 (2016) (providing that, as a part of the Medicaid Dr 
"lanof3cturer must report price data on a quarterly basis to the Cent. 
Medicare & Medicaid Services, including the "best price" for each drug, which incluc 
2?Z°, '• V'S C,' § 1396w"3a ,20U) (Priding that, as a part of Medicare Part 
ered inHcr-'vl'V11"* ™a e Quarterly reports of the "average sales price" for each drug c 
o the^ats^i Care, a BJ°! a" P"rohasers in the United States and that the calculati 
manufacturers m,nCt l discounts and rebates); 38 U.S.C.f 8126 (1997) (providing tl 
such as the^enartm covered outpatient drugs available to certain federal agenci 
Defense and ? p Veterans Affairs, the Public Health Service, the Department 
?a"d. at discounted prices, known as the "federal ceiling prk 
the manufacturer otters toV?vTte0partie1s)Ur6S ab°Ut PrfceS' including d'scountS> " 
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Certain kinds of methods for offering price reductions and in­
ducing business create particular problems for the discountTkickback 
distinction.235 For example, in some situations, sellers try to win new 
customers and encourage an initially high volume of business by pro­
viding "upfront payments" and/or "signing bonuses."236 Such payments 
generally apply to first-year purchases, and they are defined when the 
seller establishes a net price for each purchase during the first year, 
which varies with the number of purchases.237 The OIG generally 
views such payments as suspect, and they are difficult to conform to 
the "discount safe harbor" unless the payments are applied to specific 
purchases.238 
Similarly, when a seller offers a credit memo as a substitute for 
a cash discount, it may run afoul of the reporting requirements be­
cause the credits may be earned based on the purchase of certain 
products, but, are applied to reduce the purchase price of other prod­
ucts.239 When a transaction involves a discount framed as a credit 
memo, any agreement between the buyer and seller should clearly 
identify the credit as a discount, and the agreement should clearly set 
forth the allocation of the discount, so there will be no doubt that the 
discount was framed and applied at the time of the transaction.240 
Another circumstance that can lead to problems under the Anti-
Kickback statute and/or the FCA arises when a manufacturer offers 
free supplies and equipment that are incidental but necessary to the 
use of the product that the manufacturer makes and sells.241 In many 
cases, these incidental supplies and equipment have no independent 
value because they are connected with the use of the manufacturer's 
product.24'2 Whether the provision of these incidental items at no cost 
constitutes a discount depends upon the nature of such items, and both 
manufacturers and sellers can be in a quandary about how to allocate 
the value of such free equipment to other purchases.243 Along similar 
235. See D. McCarty Thornton, OIG Letter on Upfront Rebates, Prebates, and Signing 
Bonuses, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN. (July 17, 2000), http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/safeharbor-
regu lations/preba te. htm. 
236. ID. 
237. SEE ID. 
238. SEE ID. 
239. ID. 
240. ID. 
241. See e.g., Kevin G. McAnaney, OIG Letter on Free Computers, Facsimile Machines, 
and Other Goods, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN. /July 3, 1997), http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/safe 
ar 0rregulations/freecomputers.htm. 
242. See id. 
243. See id. 
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lines, manufacturers may offer free product support or reimbursement 
assistance to physicians or other providers by providing information 
regarding insurance coverage criteria and reimbursement levels foi 
their products.24"1 These services have no independent value to provid­
ers apart from the products themselves.245 In these cases, the 
incidental support services may be considered part of the products pur­
chased, and their cost may be considered bundled into the products 
prices.246 But, other reimbursement support programs may look more 
like impermissible kickbacks because they represent an independent 
financial benefit to physicians or other providers.247 These reimburse­
ment services might include requiring payment for products by 
purchasers only if the product is reimbursed by third party payors.24* 
According to the OIG, these services eliminate the normal financial 
risks for providers and create overutilization and increased costs.249 
Another potential problem associated with the sale of medical 
devices involves demonstrations and training provided by the manu­
facturer.2'0 Unlike drugs, a complicated medical device may require a 
demonstration to evaluate the device or training to ensure its appropri­
ate use.251 Most commonly, the manufacturer itself will provide such 
demonstrations or training, and, in many cases, the manufacturer will 
offer them at a central location, such as the manufacturer's own facility 
or at the site of a professional meeting, but not at the facility of each 
and every health care provider that might be interested in the de­
vice.252 When a manufacturer hosts these activities, the manufacture! 
may reimburse physicians or other provider representatives for the 
reasonable costs of travel and lodging related to attendance at training 
sessions.2'3 But, in this context, both buyers and sellers have to be 
careful to avoid covering excessive travel or lodging costs (which coulc 
R.l449,7?!G,^anCec',ogram Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed Keg. 28731, 23735 (May 5, 2003). 
245. See id. 
246. See id. 
Reg. at 23735C°mP'ianCe Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed 
248. See id. 
249. See id. 
252. See id. at 16. 
253. See id. at 16. 
IALS 11-12 (2009), https://www.advamed.org/sites/default 
SSOCIATION, CODE OF ETHICS ON INTERACTION; 
2017 REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 279 
make the demonstration seem like an excuse for a vacation for the 
buyer's representatives).254 
B. Sales of Services 
Of course, the flow of transactions between health care provid­
ers and drug and device makers flows in both directions. 
Manufacturers may purchase a wide range of services from the institu­
tions that provide health care, as well as the doctors and other 
professionals associated with the provider. Doctors and professionals 
can provide these services by acting as advisory board members, 
speakers, preceptors, or researchers.255 Anytime a manufacturer 
purchases services from a person who is a customer or is associated 
with a customer, one can question whether the manufacturer's 
purchase is merely a cover for an unlawful kickback. And, if the pur­
chased service implicates a claim for a payment from the federal 
government in one way or another, there could be questions about FCA 
liability as well. Both manufacturers and health care providers must 
be careful to assure that all arrangements for services to manufactur­
ers are commercially reasonable and should avoid any suggestion of 
excessive or improper payments to the professionals providing the 
services. 
As with other kinds of transactions between manufacturers and 
health care providers, the provision of professional services to manu­
facturers must come within one of the defined safe harbors.256 The safe 
harbor for personal services and management contracts protects cer­
tain arrangements.257 To qualify for safe harbor protection, personal 
service, and management contracts between health care providers and 
manufacturers must meet certain conditions: 
• there must be a formal, written agreement that is signed by both 
parties; 
• the agreement must cover all of the services to be provided for 
the term of the agreement; 
• the agreement must be for at least one year; 
• if the agreement provides for the services on a periodic, sporadic 
or part-time basis, the agreement must specify exactly the sched-
254. See ADVANCED MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION, supra note 250 at 16. 
"if u Purc^ase of research services from provider institutions and their employees 
will be discussed more fully in infra Section III.C in connection with the sponsorship of 
clinical trials. See infra Section III.C. 
56. OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. 
feg- 23731, 23736 (May 6, 2003). 
257. Id. 
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ule of such intervals, their precise length, and the exact charge 
for such intervals; 
• the aggregate compensation paid to the agent over the term of 
the agreement must be set in advance and be consistent with fair 
market value in arms-length transactions, and must not be de­
termined in a manner that takes into account the volume or 
value of any referrals or business otherwise generated between 
the parties for which payment may be made in whole or in part 
under Medicare or a state health program; 
• the services performed under the agreement must not involve the 
counseling or promotion of a business arrangement or other ac­
tivity that violates any state or federal law; and 
• the aggregate services contracted for must not exceed those 
which are reasonably necessary to accomplish the commercially 
reasonable business purpose of the services.258 
Some of these conditions can be difficult to accomplish. For ex­
ample, the realities and uncertainties of an evolving business 
arrangement can make it difficult, and perhaps impossible, for the 
manufacturer and the health care provider to anticipate exactly how 
and when all of the services will be provided. Consequently, it is often 
difficult to meet the requirement that aggregate compensation be set 
cnrHin T I r®qulrement that periodic services be provided ac­
cording to a set schedule. But, all is not lost if a compensation 
A IT r me6t the conditi°ns for the safe harbor exception, 
fets Wh "I 31™®61"6111 may "evertheless be permissible if it 
specific nZl c \ [ arrangement establishes in advance a 
rium for each « <t-GaC °** adyisory board service or an honora-
OIG pointed n *fGa en£aSement, it may survive scrutiny.260 As the U1G pointed out in its guidance literature: 
cians^r^'o^^^^^onsldting^or Tdv^8 t0 numbers of physi" 
raise anv smnifi! ng advis°ry services are unlikely to 
tants" when thev C0I1Cern' Compensating physicians as "consul-
primarily in a passive canarf° attend meetings or conferences 
pensation relationship* C-Vy ls susPect. Also of concern are com-
directly or imlbectlv^a man Physicians for services connected 
ities, WTZ^n7n^eTS markueting aad sales activ" 
"shadowing" services While th researoh, or preceptor or 
beneficial, they also pose a risk nfVarrange.meats are potentially 
the use of health care nmf • ^ an abuse- In particular, 
for marketing purposes-in-
Fed. Reg. 23731 (Ma^S^OOS)^0^111 Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 
259. Id. at 23738. 
260. Id. 
2017 REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 281 
eluding, for example, ghost-written papers or speeches—implicates 
the anti-kickback statute. While full disclosure by physicians of any 
potential conflicts of interest and of industry sponsorship or affilia­
tion may reduce the risk of abuse, disclosure does not eliminate the 
risk Recently, some entities have been compensating physi­
cians for time spent listening to sales representatives market 
pharmaceutical products. In some cases, these payments are char­
acterized as "consulting" fees and may require physicians to 
complete minimal paperwork. Other companies pay physicians for 
time spent accessing web sites to view or listen to marketing infor­
mation or perform "research." All of these activities are highly 
suspect under the anti-kickback statute, are highly susceptible to 
fraud and abuse, and should be strongly discouraged.261 
C. Clinical Trial Sponsorship 
The makers of drugs and medical devices also engage the pro­
fessionals employed by their customers when it comes to conducting 
research for their products. The research may be designed to generate 
the clinical data required for FDA approval of a new product or new 
indication for an existing product, or the research may be necessary to 
generate clinical data used as a basis for marketing programs for a 
product that has already been approved by the FDA. Clinical trial 
sponsorship will raise concerns under the Anti-Kickback statute to the 
extent that the clinical trial has no meaningful value to the manufac­
turer or that the compensation paid to the principal investigator/ 
health care provider for conducting the trial exceeds the fair market 
value of the services provided.262 
The OIG has set forth some basic principles governing the spon­
sorship of clinical trials. It has pointed out that: 
Manufacturers often contract with purchasers of their products to 
conduct research activities on behalf of the manufacturer on a fee-
for-service basis. These contracts should be structured to fit in the 
personal services safe harbor whenever possible. Payments for re­
search services should be fair market value for legitimate, 
reasonable, and necessary services. Post-marketing research activi­
ties should be especially scrutinized to ensure that they are 
legitimate and not simply a pretext to generate prescriptions of a 
drug. Prudent manufacturers will develop contracting procedures 
that clearly separate the awarding of research contracts from mar­
keting. Research contracts that originate through the sales or 
R^1' OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. 
at 23738. 
262- Id. at 23735-36. 
282 FLORIDA A&M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 12:2:247 
marketing functions—or that are offered to purchasers in connec­
tion with sales contacts—are particularly suspect.263 
Clinical trial sponsorships also entail FCA considerations.26-* 
Because more health care providers may be billing Medicare for ser­
vices provided in the context of a clinical trial, there is an increased 
risk that clinical trial sponsorship may implicate the FCA.265 Clinical 
trial sponsorship by manufacturers may also implicate the FCA if the 
trial involves claims to government payors when: (1) the services are 
not Medicare covered services, or (2) the services are Medicare-covered 
services, but the sponsor has paid for the services.266 The risk is also 
enhanced where payment by commercial or governmental sponsors 
un er the clinical trial agreement is not linked to specific costs.267 This 
enhances the importance of making sure that any clinical trial agree­
ments clearly set forth costs and charges in advance to the greatest 
reas ChargeS for any services are commercially 
D. Grants 
cationaf nr erl Pr°Vide grants to Pr0™°te scientific, edi 
provided to '°™mUmty servlce objectives.*" When those grants ar 
with their° ^ organizations, or individuals who are affiliate 
col be hr rei"Sathere iS 8 "Sk that the Provision of the grar 
rd theretr "l uu QUid pr° qu° for a busiaess opportunit 
CTantor mav hp " k'ckback-2™ in some cases, the benefit to th 
L ^ something as intangible as goodwill, which has rea 
St - . eC°n0miC Value'27' °f c°urse' ^e social bene 
denved from grants give regulatory authorities strong incentives t 
Reg. at 23735S6mPl'anCe Pr0gram Guid«nce for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fet 
4858 (Jan"3°I2005TPl''m!'ntal Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 70 Fed. Ref 
265. See id. 
266. Id. at 4858-59. 
Trials, Ctrs. pur MEDicAm^'MEmc^E^^"10^!0" Medicare Coverage in Clinu 
medicare-coverage-database/detaih/npH i t •. ES' (<Ju'y 9, 2007), https://www.cms.g 
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268. Id. 
Fed. Reg. at 23735C°mPlianCe Pr0gram Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 
270. Id. 
271. See id. 
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avoid leaping to the conclusion that a grant is, in fact, a kickback that 
should give rise to sanctions.272 In this way, grants create a paradox 
for regulators because government enforcement agencies have ac­
knowledged that a for-profit company may provide funding to third 
parties (including parties other than charitable organizations) even 
though there is no direct, measurable benefit to the manufacturer 
other than the promotion of goodwill.2™ Government enforcement 
agencies, however, expect that the manufacturer can demonstrate that 
the grant is a legitimate grant and not a disguised discount or other 
inducement.274 
The provision of a grant may implicate the anti-kickback stat­
ute where the grant benefits an individual or entity who is in a position 
to influence the prescription or purchase of products.275 Such a grant 
could be construed as a disguised inducement for the recipient to use or 
to promote the use of a manufacturer's products.276 For example, such 
an interpretation could be appropriate where a "grant" is provided to 
cover a routine expense the customer would otherwise incur or substi­
tute for a product discount because such "grants" are not really 
grants.277 
The OIG has offered guidance on how grantors and recipients 
can avoid any suggestion of conduct that would violate the Anti-Kick­
back statute in connection with the provision of a grant.278 
To reduce the risks that a grant program is used improperly 
to induce or reward product purchases or to market product inap­
propriately, manufacturers should separate their grant making 
functions from their sales and marketing functions. Effective sepa­
ration of these functions will help insure that grant funding is not 
inappropriately influenced by sales or marketing motivations and 
that the educational purposes of the grant are legitimate. Manufac­
turers should establish objective criteria for making grants that do 
not take into account the volume or value of purchases made by, or 
anticipated from, the grant recipient and that serve to ensure that 
the funded activities are bona fide. The manufacturer should have 
no control over the speaker or content of the educational presenta-
272. See id. 
^ee Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 
rea- Reg. at 23735. 
274. See id. 
275. See id. 
276. See id. 
2?7- See id. 
278. 
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tion. Compliance with such procedures should be documented and 
regularly monitored.279 
Grants also provide another occasion when conduct that impli­
cates the Anti-Kickback statute can also implicate the FCA.280 Grants 
may implicate the FCA to the extent that they are perceived as dis­
guised discounts.281 To minimize the risk of violating either the Anti-
Kickback statute or the FCA, grant activities should be insulated from 
sales and marketing activities.282 In this connection, there several im­
portant safeguards that can be taken to assure compliance.283 
First, potential grantors should make sure that they are not us­
ing grants to obtain new customers or reward existing customers.284 
Thus, funding should not be conditioned upon the purchase of a prod­
uct.285 A manufacturer may wish to further separate grant-giving from 
its business relationships by making information about grants gener­
ally accessible, such as by posting information on its website and by 
encouraging applications from any qualified person, not just from 
those associated with the manufacturer's market targets.286 Readily 
accessible information avoids a situation in which the only way an in­
dividual or institution could find out about available grant funds was 
through contact with a sales representative who is seeking to initiate, 
maintain or reward a customer relationship.287 
Second, the activity funded by the grant should meet estab­
lished criteria uniformly applied to assess similar activities.288 For 
example, research funded should meet objective scientific criteria.289 
To establish that the grant was provided in accordance with these cri-
£frant°rs should retain policies or other documentation regarding 
( lgi )i ity requirements for grants and the application/approval 
process.290 
Reg^at 23736C°mPlianCe Pr°gram Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. 
280. Id. 
ReTat 23734C305mPHanCe Pr°gram GuidanCe f°r Pharma«^ical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. 
282. Id. at 23736. 
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Third, to further assure that the grant is clearly distinguished 
from the grantor's ordinary business transactions, the funding should 
not be offered in lieu of a discount or to otherwise provide value to a 
customer.291 Consequently, the grantor's sales representatives should 
not be the source of information about grants, nor should they promise 
grants or otherwise indicate that grants will be provided to fund a par­
ticular activity, even if the activity meets all criteria for an award.292 
Decisions about awarding grants should be made prior to the activity 
and not after the activity to fill funding gaps.293 In short, grants should 
not subsidize the routine business operations of the customer. 
Fourth, the grant must actually be a grant. Manufacturers 
should have no control over the conduct of the activity.294 Manufactur­
ers should not influence the protocol or other aspects of research, nor 
determine the content of the educational program.295 Along the same 
lines, the grant funds should be in a reasonable amount for the pur­
poses specified in the grant, and they should actually be used for those 
purposes.296 If there are surplus funds after the grant activity is com­
plete, such a surplus should be returned to the manufacturer or, with 
the approval of the manufacturer, applied to similar activities. 
E. Educational Activities 
Academic medicine presents a problem similar to that arising in 
connection with the provision of grants. Because they provide both ed­
ucation to students and medical treatment to patients, medical schools 
and their affiliated hospitals are customers for the manufacturers of 
drugs and medical devices as well as providers of valuable informa­
tion.297 Thus, when a manufacturer provides financial support for a 
medical school's research or educational activities, it could be simply 
providing support for those activities, or it could be soliciting business 
through what amounts to a kickback.298 The OIG advises that: 
While educational funding can provide valuable information to the 
medical and health care industry, manufacturer grants to purchas-
m
' 
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ers, GPOs, PBMs and similar entities raise concerns under the 
anti-kickback statute. Funding that is conditioned, in whole or in 
part, on the purchase of product implicates the statute, even if the 
educational or research purpose is legitimate. Furthermore, to the 
extent the manufacturer has any influence over the substance of an 
educational program or the presenter, there is a risk that the edu 
cational program may be used for inappropriate marketing 
purposes.299 6 
The distinction between promotional activities in an academic 
setting and purely academic activities is also important in the context 
of regulations imposed by the Food and Drug Administration 
( FDA") 3oo The FDA distinguishes between (1) 
(programs and materials) performed by, or on behalf of, manufactur­
ers; and (2) activities, supported by manufacturers, that are otherwise 
independent of the promotional influence of the supporting manufac-
UI?r' . Pro-ams in the first category are subject to the FDA 
prohibition on off-label promotion.302 For example, speakers in sneaker 
^ rnUfaCtUrer have presentations that afl 
tirmatively address only approved uses.303 Speakers may only respond 
directly to unsolicited questions about off-label uses.30-* By contrast 
FDaIh" 3ndr "on-Promotional activities are not subject to 
A regulation, even if they receive financial support from a manufac-
turer of drugs or medical devices.305 
Continuing medical education ("CME") presents a set of related 
E' ^here can also be questions about whether the support is 
K 30™The orgardza? H " 3t Winnin§their bus" 
a ,. . ganization that provides accreditation for CME the 
offers support that^Uh |Cont,inuing Medical Education ("ACCME"), 
vent violations of 7h A ?• I? th6S6 comPliance Problems and pre­vent violations of the Anti-Kickback statute.- ACCME standards 
try-Supportefsd7ntmc7ndaEdu^to^I^Sttati0fi9Fi) Guidance for Industry: Indus-
301. Id. at 64094. hducatl0°al Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64093 (Dec. 3. 1997). 
303. Id. at 64097PP°rted Scientlfic and Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. at 64095. 
304. See id. 
305. Id. 
Activities, Accreditation c3tinij^tan^ardsJ°Insure Independence in CME 
quirements/accreditation-requirements-rmo E,)UC-> http://www.accme.org/re-
dast visited Apr. 4, 2016) Hereinafter S t a n d J Tr^tendards-for-commercial-support 
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seek to ensure that all CME activities by accredited providers are inde 
pendent, free of commercial bias, and beyond the control of commercial 
sponsors.!,,s These standards impose several important disclosure re 
quirements designed to avoid any appearance of impropriety 309 First 
these disclosure requirements apply to anyone involved in developing 
any of the content for CME programs, as well as the spouses or domes 
tic partners of persons involved in such development.3™ Second any 
form of financial support must be disclosed, regardless of whether the 
support comes is monetary or in-kind >» Third, a manufacturer cannot 
be a joint sponsor of any CME activity along with the organization or 
entity that is providing the CME program.3™ Fourth, when a CME 
provider does receive some form of financial support from a manufac­
turer, the provider must provide extensive and accurate 
documentation of the use of the funds to assure transparency 313 
In addition to all of these considerations, there are also rigorous 
standards for dealing with conflicts of interest. The ACCME standards 
prescribe that, with respect to conflicts of interest, the mere disclosure 
is not enough to eliminate any impermissible commercial bias; the 
ACCME requires that any conflicts of interest arising from be elimi­
nated entirely or controlled through the implementation of peer review 
safeguards.314 Depending upon how the conflict of interest provisions 
are ultimately applied, institutional providers and affiliated physicians 
may have their CME involvement limited.315 The risk associated with 
funding of educational programs that involve off-label discussions, in­
cluding CME programs, can be further reduced if: (1) a manufacturer 
provides funding to programs that receive support from a number of 
manufacturers; and (2) a manufacturer provides funding to a number 
of educational providers (to avoid any suggestion that an educational 
provider is dependent upon the manufacturer and will cater to the 
manufacturer in developing content).316 
308. Standards for Commercial Support, supra note 306. 
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F. Charitable Donations 
The potentially sweeping effect of the Anti-Kickback statute is 
so great that even a "charitable donation"317 creates some risk of being 
characterized as a kickback. Of course, many health care providers 
such as hospitals or physician groups associated with academic medi­
cal centers, are also considered charitable organizations.31« 
Manufacturers may be solicited for donations because providers will 
often look to members of the community or business partners in seek­
ing donations as these individuals or organizations are familiar to the 
provider. For their participation, manufacturers also have significant 
incentives for promoting research, education, and community service 
activities through charitable contributions. Problems may arise if the 
donee is also a customer of a manufacturer and if there is any sugges­
tion that the donation is being offered or solicited as a quid pro quo for 
the continuation of the business relationship between the donor and 
donee.319 Here again, avoiding liability under either the Anti-Kickback 
statute or under tax law depends upon assuring that the charitable 
character of the donation is confirmed by independent documentation. 
The persons involved in both paying and receiving the donation should 
not be the same individuals who are involved in making the decisions 
about buying and selling in the commercial dimension of the 
relationship. 
CONCLUSION 
It is no easy task to develop a compliance program for healtl 
care services. In particular, one that is well-adapted to the often open 
ended requirements of the Anti-Kickback statute and the FCA. Be 
cause the business relationships in health care services are ofter 
complicated, involving multiple relationships in different contexts be 
tween the same two parties, there are few bright-line rules that always 
agentsand ^ GaSily COmmunicated to managers, employees, anc 
The absence of bright-line rules makes it difficult for healtl 
care corporations to pursue the adversarial approach to compliance 
onranizatlon^pi^16 * 3 donation of funds to a charitable organization (ar 
§ 50 H c X3) as a rnnt'"h i ^ ReVenue Service to be tax-exempt under 26 U.S.C 
3 1 8 T u  S U p p o r t s  t h e  S t a b l e  p u r p o s e s  o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  
zations/public-dlaritles^last visited^Mar!1^2^I^cha"ties"non"prof'ts^c^lari^a^Ie"or^an' 
ers^S Fai ^ Pharmaceutical Manufactur 
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Viewing the law as an external constraint and taking an adversarial 
approach to compliance means that corporations will try to keep their 
conduct as close to the boundaries of the law as possible, minimizing 
both their costs and the extent of their compliance. If there are no clear 
rules to follow, however, it is difficult or impossible for a corporation 
and its employees and agents to have confidence that their chosen 
course of action is going to skirt the edges of illegality. When the re­
quirements of the law are murky, there is substantial risk that an 
official from an enforcement authority might view something as illegal, 
even if the corporation thinks that it is lawful. Consequently, with re­
spect to the Anti-Kickback Statute and the FCA, it is difficult to rely on 
the adversarial approach to compliance programs. 
The problems with the adversarial approach make an argument 
for viewing compliance as a goal rather than a constraint, at least in 
the field of health care services. Because those statutes impose vague 
rules, employees and agents cannot be sure of the legality of their con­
duct unless they have internalized the operative principles behind the 
statute and engaged in the process of trying to apply those principles in 
every situation. This kind of approach is exactly what is involved in 
treating compliance as an internal goal rather than an external con­
straint. The health care services field creates a powerful example of 
how and why it can be better to view compliance as a goal rather than 
a constraint. 
This does not mean that it will be easy to make compliance a 
goal rather than a constraint. As a practical matter, it is impossible to 
apply the New Governance approach to the health care context because 
there is no single agency (or even a small group of agencies) who are 
responsible for enforcement and with whom health care providers can 
engage in dialogue. Indeed, because a great deal of enforcement au­
thority is effectively delegated to private parties who can bring qui tarn 
actions that the government may or may not choose to join, health care 
providers can never really know where the enforcement action is com­
ing from and therefore can never know exactly how to collaborate with 
the enforcing authority. 
But, even if a pure form of the New Governance approach is not 
a practical reality for improving compliance programs in the health 
care industry, the concepts behind New Governance still have much to 
offer those responsible for developing compliance programs that have 
to address the fluid requirements of the Anti-Kickback statute and the 
FCA. One of the crucial aspects of the New Governance paradigm is 
the idea that compliance programs should be founded upon the com­
munication of fundamental legal and ethical principles and of methods 
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that individual employees can use to make sound judgments about 
lawful conduct in the absence of black-letter rules.320 Perhaps most im 
portantly, the New Governance approach involves training employee 
to internalize certain legal guidelines, so that they think of compliance 
as a goal rather than an externally imposed constraint.321 If a comnl' 
ance program cultivates the idea that the Anti-Kickback statute and 
the FCA are purely constraints on employee action and that complying 
with those statutes involves rote rule-following behavior, compliance 
will be manifestly imperfect because employees will inevitably find 
themselves in novel situations where the existing frameworks for an 
plying the law do not clearly apply. By contrast, if compliance focuses 
on communicating core principles and developing independent jude-
h.16"1' e™Ployees will be far better prepared to deal with the ever 
shitting factual circumstances in which they must apply the law. 
In this respect, it will be essential for health care compliance 
programs to emphasize the collaborative ethos of the New Governance 
approach in the relationship between internal counsel, the compliance 
'7S' ar"! the mrfrs' emPloyees' and a^nts who must carry out 
the day-to-day work of compliance. Those in charge of the compliance 
I gram must be in constant communication with employees to learn 
about new circumstances in which the law must be applied and^ to con 
vey new information about the judicial decisions Ld other legal 
tior"nd co lloeCtneW teCtT ^  ^  laW' This kind of communica-
rr th?heaith care w^on ^  is the key to assuring that companies always base their compliance efforts on 
tt a. cot?atl°K au°Ut b°th thG l3W itselfand ever evolving factual context in which the law must be applied. 
To illustrate how useful it can be to build a compliance nropram 
S:*:" ?"V1rr-
hold an education I C3 Sck a its associated hospital seek to 
developinfresearch rfr physidans at the hospital regarding 
FDA has not h S n®W WayS to use an existing drug. The 
signed t enlurarferrtrr°Ved ^ "eW USeS' the de-
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show "hysidans howlotrea m»t methods, but, it is not desired to 
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a fund that will fund new research efforts by hospital staff and/or med­
ical school faculty and students. The fund will be administered by both 
the drug manufacturer and the medical school faculty, who will jointv 
decide on who will receive the research grants. 
In this situation, there are three entities interacting- a hospital 
its medical school, and a drug manufacturer. But, these interactions 
are not perfectly straightforward because they involve multiple roles 
for each participant. The hospital is acting as both a customer of the 
drug manufacturer and as a partner of the medical school in its educa­
tional mission. The medical school is acting primarily in furtherance of 
its non-profit educational mission, but its actions also have commercial 
value, and some doctors who are on both the medical school faculty and 
the hospital staff have a dual role as both educators and commercial 
actors. For its part, the drug manufacturer is acting both as a charita­
ble contributor and as a commercial actor seeking to develop new 
business. When each of these three entities takes an action in connec­
tion with the educational program, it will have to be keenly aware of 
what particular role it is advancing with that action, and it will have to 
be especially careful to distinguish between commercial and non-profit 
actions. 
None of this can be done unless the individual physicians and 
staff who are involved in the program are aware of the multi-faceted 
nature of their roles and the differing legal principles and rules that 
apply to each facet. And there is no way to construct a compliance pro­
gram that can provide advance directives prescribing how each 
individual actor should conduct himself or herself in any particular sit­
uation. Instead of giving individuals a compliance "script" to follow, the 
compliance program for any of the entities involved in this example 
must provide individuals with a method for reasoning through the 
compliance problems on their own. And, just as important, an effective 
compliance program would give individuals a mechanism for engaging 
with compliance officers in an on-going dialogue about emerging 
problems and solutions. 
Finally, there is another reason to view compliance as a goal 
rather than a constraint, and this reason is the most fundamentally 
important one of them all. The entities that deliver health care services 
have an inherent and inescapable obligation to serve the public inter­
est. Because most of these entities are organized as non-profits, and 
ecause they are necessarily devoted to promoting health and well-be-
J^g generally, they cannot be exclusively devoted to maximizing profit. 
ey must pursue non-economic objectives, including and especially 
t ose defined by law. For this reason, it is not enough for them to view 
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compliance with the law as a constraint. Rather, such compliance must 
be internalized as a goal. And, to effectively accomplish this internal­
ization, it is useful and important for health care entities to adopt 
elements of the New Governance approach. 
